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Thanks to Patrick Bondy for these inspiring comments that allows me to further explain the 
arguments and rationale of  the integrated conception of  ignorance. 
 
Weak and Strong Ignorance 
 
Bondy’s suggestion that there is weak ignorance and strong ignorance just as there is strong 
and weak knowledge is very interesting and perceptive (Bondy 2018, 11-12). But I take it that 
this distinction is more relevant for defenders of  the propositional conception of  ignorance, 
in particular supporters of  the Standard View and New View.  
 
In my reply to Peels (2019), I suggest that we should not see knowledge and ignorance as 
simple opposites, nor that their accounts should be mirrored. And in the original article I 
have argued that the Standard View and the New View are not adequate for capturing 
ignorance. Therefore, Bondy’s suggestion and the related criticism of  the debate between the 
Standard View and New View is not as pertinent for my integrated conception of  ignorance, 
but I think it should be taken seriously as an alternative approach to distinguishing forms of  
ignorance. 
 
 “Agential Ignorance” and “Agential Conception of  Ignorance”  
 
I need to point to a terminological issue in Bondy’s reply that may be central for 
distinguishing conceptions of  ignorance and particular instances of  ignorance, and thus also 
for motivating and defending the integrated conception of  ignorance: Bondy swiftly changes 
between “agential conception of  ignorance” and “agential ignorance” and seems to use 
these terms interchangeably. Similarly, for “structural conception of  ignorance” and 
“structural ignorance”.  
 
But these terms are importantly distinct: the former refers to a conception or an approach, 
the latter to a form of  ignorance, or also particular instances of  ignorance. In my article I 
only discuss agential conceptions and structural conceptions and I do not use the terms 
“agential ignorance” or “structural ignorance” because I am specifically interested in 
conceptions of  ignorance 
 
Practical Ignorance 
 
Bondy, like Peels, points out that I do not address lack of  practical knowledge or lack of  
know-how. Again, I fully agree that this is an open question in my article and for the 
integrated conception and I look forward to addressing this question in more detail. In his 
reply, Bondy suggests that my integrated conception can be extended to apply to such 
“practical ignorance” in the following way: 
 
Theoretical ignorance: this would remain as El Kassar formulates her integrated 
conception of  ignorance, as “a disposition of  an epistemic agent that manifests itself  
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in her beliefs – either she has no belief  about p or a false belief  – and her epistemic 
attitudes (doxastic attitudes, epistemic virtues, epistemic vices)”  
Practical ignorance: a disposition of  an agent that manifests itself  in her actions – 
where S fails to φ, or S does not φ well or properly – and her practical attitudes (ethical 
and pragmatic attitudes, ethical or practical virtues and vices). (Bondy 2018, 13) 
 
Yet, I have to reject this charitable extension. Bondy, as well as Peels, is right that there is 
work to do in this field, but simply imposing the integrated conception on “practical 
ignorance” would not be appropriate, nor is it an approach that I would wish to take.  
 
First, I doubt that we can simply replace epistemic attitudes, virtues and vices with practical 
attitudes, practical virtues and vices to cover the practical case. Second, I think we need to 
respect the highly-evolved debate about know-how and include their concerns and 
arguments in any account that wants to address the lack of  know-how or lack of  practical 
knowledge. Any further conclusions require starting communication between the different 
fields and debates – a genuinely exciting prospect for philosophy of  ignorance!  
 
A first step might be to examine the terminology that we are using: Bondy discusses 
“practical ignorance” but maybe the term “incompetence” is more apt for these practical 
cases? Interestingly enough, psychologists who work on ignorance and meta-ignorance 
sometimes frame ignorance in terms of  incompetence, see, for example Dunning in 
describing the Dunning-Kruger-Effect (Dunning 2011, 260). 
 
Finally, and more fundamentally, I do not see why one should go for a unified account of  
theoretical and practical ignorance that uses the same components for both forms of  
ignorance. As I explain in my reply to Peels, I think that one should not aim for a unified 
account of  ignorance and knowledge but instead take the phenomena seriously as they are. 
For now I take the same considerations to hold for theoretical ignorance and practical 
ignorance.  
 
 “We Can Say Everything That We Want to Say About Ignorance” 
 
Bondy claims that “we can say everything we want to say about ignorance” (Bondy 2018, 9) 
with the propositional conception. But his claim is based on the assumption that what I call 
constituents of  ignorance really are just causes of  ignorance and I hope that my clarificatory 
remarks in this reply and my reply to Peels’ contribution explain why the assumption is not 
warranted and why the propositional conception does not say enough about ignorance. Let 
me briefly return to some arguments to motivate my position: 
 
One problem is that Bondy’s (and Peels’) interpretation of  closed-mindedness and other 
virtues or vices as causes of  ignorance makes it seem as if  these virtues and vices are 
naturally efficient causes; i.e. they turn the original claim that epistemic virtues and vices are 
co-constituents of  ignorance into the claim that they are efficient causes.  
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But I would like to hear more about why we should draw this conclusion or why it is 
warranted. Again, a parallel in philosophy of  know-how may be helpful in that context: 
know-how as a disposition does not explain why a performance occurred, it explains “why a 
certain kind of  act … is possible in the first place” (Löwenstein 2017, 85, emphasis in 
original). And, similarly, a disposition, like open-mindedness or closed-mindedness, does not 
explain why someone does not know that p or why someone is ignorant of  that particular 
fact. We need events in the world, decisions, beliefs, and motivations and the like to explain 
why someone is ignorant.  
 
Second, as I say in the article, ignorance is more than a doxastic issue, it also has an 
attitudinal component, how one is ignorant – not how one has become ignorant, but the 
particular character of  one’s ignorance. That also involves more than saying what kind of  
ignorance (e.g. propositional ignorance or practical ignorance) the particular instance belongs 
to. There is another facet of  ignorance that is constitutive of  ignorance and it cannot be 
captured by the propositional conception since it is restricted to the doxastic component.  
 
That is why I want to say more about ignorance than just refer to the doxastic component. 
And even more, I suggest that everyone who wants to capture actual instances of  ignorance 
should want to say more about ignorance than the propositional conception does.1  
 
Contact details: nadja.elkassar@gess.ethz.ch 
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